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The next section entails a discussion of some related efforts 
which is followed by the RISM system design in section 
III. Section IV describes protocol and the simulation results 
are given in the section V. The last section presents some 
concluding remarks. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
Reputation-based systems are a new paradigm and are 
being used for enhancing security in different areas. These 
systems are lightweight, easy to use and are capable of facing 
a wide variety of attacks,  as  long  as  they  are  observable 
[1]. Misbehavior Detection and Reputation based intrusion 
detection Systems may be distributed or local. Here, fully 
distributed means that information regarding reputation change 
of a node is immediately propagated in whole network. In the 
latter case, called Local Reputation based Systems, nodes are 
fully dependent on their own personal view about reputation 
and behavior of other nodes. 
Distributed IDS protocols either rely only on first-hand 
information or on positive second-hand information. CONFI- 
DANT proposed by Buchegger and Le Boudec [2] and CORE 
[3] proposed by P. Michiardi fall into this category. Some basic 
problems with this approach of global reputation systems are: 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The flexible structure and volatile environment of Mobile 
Adhoc NETworks (MANETs) causes significant node misbe- 
haviour. It not only degrades the overall Network performance, 
but also becomes difficult to detect an Intruder, on grounds of 
mobility of the Nodes. Thus, there is a serious need for a 
robust Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for MANETs. 
Some fundamental problems of MANETs must be kept in 
mind while designing any security solution. First, it is often 
very hard to differentiate intrusions and normal operations or 
conditions in MANETs because of the dynamically changing 
topology and volatile physical environment. Second, mobile 
nodes are autonomous units that are capable of roaming 
independently in an unrestricted geographical topology. This 
means that nodes with inadequate physical protection can be 
captured, compromised, or hijacked. Third, decision-making 
in ad-hoc networks is usually decentralized and many ad-hoc 
network algorithms rely  on  the  cooperative  participation  of 
all nodes. Most ad-hoc routing protocols are also cooperative 
in nature and hence can be easily misguided by false routing 
information. Without  any  counter policy, the  effects of mis- 
behavior have been shown to dramatically decrease network 
performance. In this paper, we have proposed a new technique 
based on Reputation for efficiently solving the problem of 
intrusion detection. 
Every node has to maintain O(n) reputation information 
where n is number of nodes in network. 
Extra traffic generation in reputation exchange. 
Extra computation in accepting indirect reputation infor- 
mation (secondhand information) esp. Bayesian Estima- 
tion. 
Security issues in reputation exchange such as reputation 
data packets can be modified. 
Second  type  of  IDS  is  one  that  solely  depends  upon 
• 
• 
• 
• 
The 
the first hand observation for reputation maintenance which 
may be called Local Systems. OCEAN [4] by Bansal  and 
Baker falls in this category. In these systems, nodes make 
routing decisions based only on the direct observations of their 
neighbor nodes. This eliminates most of the trust manager 
complexity, but, in a highly mobile ad-hoc network, it might 
not be appropriate to depend solely upon personal observation. 
Also, using second-hand information can significantly acceler- 
ate the detection and subsequent isolation of malicious nodes 
in mobile ad-hoc networks [5]. 
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III.  RISM-OVERVIEW 
As previously stated, RISM design is based on the Repu- 
tation paradigm and possesses a Semi-distributed nature. The 
term semi-distributed is used for the system observation which 
is neither restricted locally to our self nor immediately propa- 
gated it to the whole network as is the case in true distributed 
systems like CONFIDANT. The design has been kept very 
simple keeping in mind the amount of traffic already in the 
network and the critical amount of battery and computational 
power individual nodes possess. RISM system runs on every 
node in network and consists of the following modules: 
 
A. Monitor 
The Monitor, holds the responsibilty of monitoring activities 
in the Neighborhood using PACKs (Passive ACKnowledge- 
ments) which have been provided as a feature in the DSR 
protocol specifications [6] as Promiscuous Mode. Every node 
registers all the data packets sent by it to next node and when 
it receives packets in promiscuous mode, it matches those to 
the queue of registered packets present in its buffer. After a 
fixed time interval -termed as the Timing Window, nodes make 
a log of number of packets for which they haven’t received 
acknowledgment in the form of PACK and communicate it to 
the reputation manager. In existing Reputation systems every 
packet is kept waiting for its PACK for a fixed time interval, in 
contrast we have used the concept of Timing Window, which 
gives us flexibility of checking timeout on  fixed  intervals 
(that is after every second) rather checking it  on  basis  of 
each individual packet’s timeout. Monitor maintains a log of 
activity of next neighbor for each Window and sends it to 
Reputation manager. The Monitor also takes into consideration 
the congestion state of nodes, which shall be explained in next 
subsection. 
 
B. Reputation  System 
Reputation system module assigns and maintains reputation 
of different nodes. Reputation of any node can change due to: 
• Self observation 
• WARNING Message, issued by neighboring nodes 
• Avoid List, appended to the RREQ/RREP header 
All the three ways have associated reputation weights with 
maximum weightage to self observation. The reputation is 
updated after every Time Window and information is com- 
municated by means of avoid lists, thereby avoiding much 
of network overhead [5]. A node may be tagged as Normal, 
Suspicious or Malicious depending on the reputation value 
associated with it. A node may degrade its reputation by 
degrading its  performance or it  may  get Positive  Appraisal 
on normal behavior. After each timing window Reputation 
system receives activity log of next hop neighbor from monitor 
with number of packets for which it does not receive PACK, 
called as Missing or Dropped Packets. The number of missing 
packets is then compared with the  MaliciousDropThreshold 
and if it is less, then the reputation manager gives positive 
performance appraisal else negative. Unlike existing systems 
RISM system does not have a fixed MaliciousDropThreshold, 
instead we have introduced the concept of Congestion Param- 
eter: 
Current queue status 
(1) Congestion P arameter = 
T otal queue length 
with the assumption that next nodes is also in same congestion 
state as the node in contention, misbehavior drop threshold is 
dynamically decided after each timing window as 
 
M aliciousDropT hreshold = M axP acketRate×CongestionP arameter 
(2) 
In order to deal with the attacks on a typical reputation system, 
like those of ‘Collusion of liars’ and ‘false warning message’, 
the system has a policy that nodes can be categorized mali- 
cious only by Self-observation. It helps in nullifying the effect 
of attacks of false warning messages and collusion of liars 
as the false warning messages they spread, can only decrease 
reputation of nodes to a certain extent, which is termed as a 
Suspicious threshold. After which, the system solely depends 
upon its self observation. Warning messages and Avoid List 
are only effective above suspicious threshold. Thus, a node is 
declared malicious eventually through self observation only. 
Whenever any node has a reputation in that category and the 
deciding node receives any new warning message or avoid 
list appearance, the system performs a Knock Test, a test 
designed solely for checking authenticity of a node against 
whom the deciding node constantly receives such information. 
In this test, the deciding node generates a fake data packet 
and forwards it to the node in question. If next nodes forward 
this packet successfully, then system gives it a performance 
appraisal and clears its account else the node is declared as 
malicious. This test can be performed only on nodes in strict 
or the immediate neighborhood. If the node in question is 
actually malicious, then it is likely to drop the test packet and 
hence, monitor shall report its activity to reputation manager 
and appropriate steps are taken; else, its packets are forwarded 
and its account cleared. 
 
C.  Path Manager 
The path manager performs trivial path management func- 
tions in collaboration with DSR core. Path ranking according 
to path priority forrmula as given below, updating path-cache 
on diffrent events like when new nodes declared as malicious 
or malicious node is taken back in network, taking decision 
on recieving route request or traffic from malicious nodes are 
few responsibilities of path manager. 
The  following  function  may  be  used  to  decide  the  path 
priority if need arises: 
P ath P riority α 1   |M inimum reputation of N ode in path|×no of hops 
(3) 
D.  Redemption And Fading 
Redemption and Fading  are included in  design of RISM 
to allow nodes previously considered malicious  to  become 
part of network again as ad-hoc networks run on cooperation 
and collaboration of peer nodes and no one gets benefited 
without cooperating with each other. Knock test is very crucial 
for nodes in suspicious category and node may fail this test 
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due to various reasons like transient link failures, congestion 
or resetting of the network interface etc. and once they fail 
this test, they are declared as malicious. To account for these 
problems, RISM uses the Fading mechanism. After a certain 
inactivity period, the reputation of a node is decreased by a 
certain predefined fading rate and finally the node is moved 
from the malicious list to middle of suspicious category. But, 
the node is not given Neutral Rating [7] so that if the node 
again misbehaves, it is immediately put in malicious list and 
all transactions through that node are blocked. Here, inactivity 
period means no appearance in any WARNING messages or 
avoid  list. 
the  malicious  list,  RISM  adds  variable-length  field  to  the 
DSR Route-Request Packet (RREQ) called the Avoid-List [5], 
a concept taken from OCEAN. The avoid list is a list of 
nodes that the source of RREQ wants to avoid in its future 
routes. During RREP, only a path with clean nodes is preferred 
over those containing suspicious nodes and malicious nodes. 
Replies from such nodes are also dropped and nodes do not 
process request and/or forward data packets from these nodes. 
Any node receiving an RREQ checks the RREQ avoid list 
and depending upon the avoid list, nodes having their name 
in list may be simply dropped. In case if they reply to it by 
appending them to path, then, at route reply phase, the reply 
is suppressed if path contains any node listed in avoid list 
or in the locally-maintained faulty list. On re-broadcasting a 
RREQ, a node appends its faulty list to the avoid list of the 
RREQ packet avoiding repetition of already appended nodes. 
If during traffic flow, a new node is declared malicious, then, 
all paths containing that node are deleted from route cache 
and a route error is generated, stating that their link to the 
destination node has been broken. Neighbors after recieving a 
route error clear the activity log of the node which generates 
a route error, from the current timing window. 
 
V.  IMPLEMENTATION/SIMULATION 
This section describes the  simulation  environment  setup 
on the Network Simulator (version 2.29) and compares the 
throughput of RISM system against a Defenseless DSR pro- 
tocol. The random waypoint model is selected as a mobility 
model in a 1000 × 1000 m2  rectangular field with five different 
pause times: 0, 100, 300, 600 and 900 seconds. There are two 
type of scenario setups having a total of 10 and 20 nodes, 
with varying 10 to 100% malicious nodes participating in 
each. We use max 5 and 10 CBR connections for 10 and 20 
nodes respectively, sending 64 bytes packets with a 4 pkts.s−1 
sending rate. The malicious nodes behave in the following 
way: dropping an average of 99% of the CBR-connection 
packets (data packets). However, malicious nodes do not drop 
DSR routing packets like route request, route reply or error as 
it is assumed that they always want to be part of the network. 
 
Table 1: Fixed Parameters 
IV.  PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION 
 
Initially all the nodes are given Neutral Rating and rating 
is incremented and decremented on receiving positive and 
negative events respectively from the Monitor component. 
Rating of a node never goes above 0 (Neutral rating) as this 
may lead to favoring of certain nodes in the path, hence 
causing depletion or draining of resources of these nodes. 
Thus, preventing attacks of type when a node first earns 
reputation  and  then  starts  dropping  packets.  A  node  can 
Fig. 1.    RISM System Behaviour 
declare a neighborhood node malicious only through its self 
observation. As shown in the figure 2, each node monitors the 
behavior of its next-hop neighbors through promiscuous mode. 
All monitoring events are done in a particular timing window 
after which, reports are submitted to reputation manager for 
updating the reputation value (transition 2.2 in Fig. 1). When 
a node crosses the malicious threshold, it is declared as 
malicious and a WARNING  message  is  broadcasted  only 
for immediate neighbors (transition 3.1 in Fig. 1). Thus, 
protecting the network from reputation flooding. On receiving 
WARNING message, each node decrements reputation value 
of reported node with associated weight -as described in repu- 
tation manager (transition 3.2 in Fig. 1). Whenever reputation 
of neighborhood node falls below suspicious threshold and a 
WARNING message is received, then Knock test is performed 
on that node. If node passes the test, then it is put in the middle 
of suspicious category, else it is categorized as malicious and 
WARNING is broadcasted. 
To make it possible to avoid routes containing nodes  in 
A malicious node which drops all the packets is less suscep- 
tible to harm the network because during the route discovery 
process, it would not be able to include itself in any of the 
236 
Parameter Level 
Area 1000 m × 1000 m 
Speed uniformly  distributed  between 
 0 and 10 m.s−1 
Radio Range 250 m 
Placement uniform 
Movement random waypoint model 
MAC 802.11 
Sending capacity 2 Mbps 
Application CBR 
Packet size 64 B 
Simulation time 900 s 
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the whole network. 
For evaluating the performance of RISM, we consider the 
following metrics: Packet Delivery Ratio and Routing Over- 
head. Packet delivery ratio is simply calculated as ratio of data 
packets received to data packets send. For routing overhead, 
we consider the ratio of number of control packets generated 
(request, reply and error) to the number of data packets sent. 
Routing overhead ratio gives approximate number of control 
packets for each data  packet  send.  This  ratio  should  not 
be significantly large as compared to that of normal DSR. 
Unless otherwise specified, the experiments are repeated ten 
times with varying random seed.  The  fixed  parameters  for 
the simulation are listed in Table 1. Finally, CBR (Constant 
Bit Rate) has been chosen for traffic. The scenario and traffic 
CNA 
Fig. 3.    Routing Overhead Comparison connection files have been randomly generated using CMU’s 
cbrgen and setdest utility. 
VI. RESULT 
Results after simulation of Packet Delivery Ratio are shown 
in Figure (2). Our system RISM performs better than normal 
VII.  CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVE 
Mobile ad hoc networks have a number of significant secu- 
rity issues which cannot be solved alone by Intrusion detection 
systems. In this paper we have critically examined the existing 
systems and outlined their strength and shortcomings. This 
analysis forms the basis for the proposed socially inspired 
reputation based Intrusion Detection System, RISM for mobile 
ad-hoc network. Detailed simulations are carried out for RISM 
on ns-2 for their adequacy and performance evaluation. Con- 
gestion parameter, Knock test and Timing window are some 
new concepts that are introduced in this paper, which require 
some further analysis. 
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